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Rwanda	 High	 Unstable	 Unstable	 Strong	 Low	
Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo	
High	 Unstable	 Unstable	 Strong	 High	
Botswana	 Low	 Stable	 Stable	 Weak	 Low	
Gabon	 Low	 Stable	 Unstable	 Strong	 High	
*The	amount	of	development	aid	received	by	the	countries	are	divided	into	two	groups:	“High”	for	an	average	
amount	of	aid	superior	to	1000	million	dollars	a	year,	and	“Low”	for	an	average	amount	of	aid	inferior	to	1000	
million	dollars	for	the	2010-2016	period.		
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								In	this	paper,	I	tested	the	second	theory,	according	to	which	foreign	aid	is	related	to	
political	instability	(Brautigam	&	Knack,	2004	;	Svensson,	2000;	Moyo,	2009).	As	illustrated	in	
Table	1	above,	I	chose	two	countries	that	have	received	an	important	amount	of	development	
aid	within	the	past	decades,	and	two	others	representing	countries	that	received	an	amount	of	
development	aid	lower	than	the	African	average	(OECD	report,	2016).	As	we	can	see	in	Table	1,	
the	findings	show	that	the	theory	is	supported	in	three	of	the	four	cases	studied	here.	Thus,	by	
discussing	the	amount	of	development	aid	received	by	each	country,	as	well	as	the	quality	of	
governance,	and	its	relationship	to	the	political	instability	of	the	recipient	country,	we	can	see	
that	in	most	cases,	a	high	amount	of	aid	is	related	to	bad	governance	and	political	instability.		
In	the	first	country	discussed,	we	can	see	that	Rwanda,	one	of	the	biggest	African	recipient	
country	in	term	of	development	aid	(OECD	report,	2016),	is	characterized	by	a	high	level	of	
poverty	with	two	third	of	its	population	living	in	extreme	poverty,	as	well	as	a	low	level	in	the	
respect	of	political	and	civil	liberties	(Caplan,	2007).	Whilst	Rwanda	has	avoided	any	violent	
internal	civil	conflicts	since	the	1990’s,	it	is	still	carrying	the	weights	of	the	millions	of	dead	
Rwandese	dead	during	the	civil	war	and	genocide	in	the	early	1990’s.	The	Democratic	Republic	
of	Congo,	one	of	the	bigger	African	recipient	country	in	development	aid	since	its	creation	in	
1969,	also	supports	the	theory.	With	a	perpetual	political	instability	that	continues	today,	a	high	
level	of	corruption	among	its	government	(Kandolo,	2015),	and	a	high	level	of	poverty	among	
its	population,	the	RDC	Is	amongst	the	poorer	and	most	corrupted	country	in	Africa	and	in	the	
world.		
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								The	third	country	discussed	in	this	paper,	Botswana,	chosen	for	the	low	amount	of	
development	aid	that	it	has	received,	also	supports	the	theory.	A	high	level	of	transparency	
among	it	government,	a	higher	level	of	civil	and	political	liberties	compared	to	the	African	
average,	and	a	quick	economic	growth	have	led	Botswana	to	a	relative	political	stability	since	its	
independence	in	1966.	Botswana	illustrates	the	difference	between	African	countries	that	have	
received	a	lot	of	development	aid,	and	those	who	have	received	less	aid,	and	how	this	lower	
amount	of	development	aid	is	related	to	a	better	political	stability.		
	
								The	last	country	discussed	in	this	paper,	Gabon	is	the	only	country	that	does	not	support	
the	theory	according	to	which	countries	who	receive	more	development	aid	will	be	more	
politically	unstable.	Indeed,	Gabon	being	amongst	the	African	countries	that	have	received	the	
lowest	amount	of	development	aid	within	the	past	decades,	was	expected	to	be	characterized	
by	a	good	quality	of	governance	as	well	as	politically	stable.	If	Gabon	hasn’t	been	as	unstable	as	
Rwanda	or	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	by	avoiding	a	civil	war	or	genocide,	the	country	is	
characterized	by	a	high	level	of	corruption	among	its	government,	a	lack	of	freedom	of	press,	
freedom	of	expression,	as	well	as	an	absence	of	respect	for	civil	and	political	rights.	This	bad	
quality	of	governance	has	led	Gabon	to	an	overall	political	instability	with	various	social	protest,	
violent	confrontation	between	the	population	and	governmental	authorities	as	well	as	coup	
d’état	(World	Bank	Report,	2018).	Whilst	Gabon	hasn’t	been	as	unstable	as	Rwanda	and	the	
RDV	it	does	not	support	the	theory.		
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								Even	though	three	out	of	four	the	cases	support	the	hypothesis,	this	paper	can	be	flawed	
by	several	factors.	First,	I	tried	to	choose	four	countries	that	became	independent	
approximately	at	the	time,	avoiding	violent	conflicts	with	the	former	European	colonizer,	
however	it	was	impossible	to	find	four	African	countries	with	the	exact	same	historical	and	
political	background.	Moreover,	my	original	plan	was	to	choose	countries	that	had	been	
colonized	by	the	same	European	powers	(two	French	colonies:	one	receiving	a	lot	of	aid,	the	
other	receiving	an	amount	of	aid	lower	than	the	African	average,	and	two	British	colonies	based	
on	the	same	principle)	in	order	for	the	results	to	not	be	biased	by	the	colonial	background	of	
the	country.	However,	the	difference	in	the	amount	of	aid	wasn’t	consequent	enough	to	
compare	the	direct	impact	of	the	aid	on	the	quality	of	governance	and	political	stability	
between	the	two	groups	of	countries.			
	
								Since	it’s	been	discussed	in	this	paper	that	political	stability	doesn’t	necessarily	mean	a	
high	level	of	democracy,	it	would	be	interesting	for	future	research	to	focus	on	the	same	
countries	and	study	the	relationship	between	the	amount	of	development	aid	received	by	
these	four	countries	and	the	level	of	democratization	each	country	has	experienced	since	its	
independence.	Whilst	this	paper	presents	some	anomalies	and	doesn’t	fully	support	the	tested	
theory,	it’s	a	good	contribution	to	the	existing	literature	on	the	effectiveness	of	foreign	aid	in	
Africa	
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